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Articles
TELEPATHIC LAW
Larry Alexander*
The debate between originalists (of the authoriallyintended-meaning variety) and their opponents usually has two
strands. One strand has to do with what interpreting a text is.
1
Originalists like me—a group that includes Paul Campos,
2
3
4
Stanley Fish, Steven Knapp, Walter Benn Michaels, and Sai
5
Prakash —argue that when one is interpreting a text, as opposed
to doing other things with it, one is necessarily seeking its
author’s or authors’ intended meaning. After all, a text is just a
code, a set of symbols—sounds, marks, flags, puffs of smoke,
pictures, etc.—selected by an author to convey an idea to a
specific audience. No set of symbols self-declares the code that it
is. It may look like twenty-first century American English as
prescribed by Merriam-Webster and Strunk & White. But it may
be a different code. It may be Esperanto, or it may be a code in
French keyed to a certain American novel. It may be nineteenth
century South African English, or Australian English. It may be
a Martian language that perhaps uses the spaces between the
marks as its letters. Or it may not be a code at all, but marks
made by wind and rain, a leaky pen, or monkeys on typewriters.
All of these are logical possibilities. For originalists like me,
however, one can only successfully interpret a text by
determining what code it is, which itself is determined by
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law. Thanks to Steve Smith and Mitch Berman for their comments.
1. Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 388
(1993).
2. Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005).
3. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not A Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2005).
4. Id.; see also Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 21 (2009).
5. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).
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authorial intent. An author or authors can be more or less skilled
at making clear to his or their intended audience what code is
being used. For if the audience doesn’t know what code is being
used, the uptake intended by the author will fail to occur.
The originalist (of my stripe) derives from this point a
corollary: If you derive any meaning from a text other than the
authorially-intended one, you are not interpreting that text.
Rather, you are imagining it to be a different text. You are
imagining it either to have been written by authors other than its
actual authors, or to have been written in a different context
(with different concerns and goals) from its actual context, or to
have been employing a code other than the code actually
employed. You can “interpret” The Waste Land by imagining its
author to have been e. e. cummings or Eminem and not T. S.
Eliot. You can imagine “Meet me at the bank” to have been
uttered by a fly fisherman rather than a banker. And you can
imagine the Equal Protection Clause to have been written by
Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, William O. Douglas, or Anthony
Kennedy rather than by the post-Civil War Congress. All that is
possible, but it is not interpretation. It is re-authoring,
appropriating someone else’s symbols for one’s own purposes,
like the kidnapper who cuts out the letters for his ransom note
from a magazine.
At this point the opponents of originalism usually respond
with a loud “Sez who?” Who are we originalists to legislate the
meaning of “meaning” or “interpretation”? You can call what
we nonoriginalists do with texts non-interpretation or reauthoring, but we call it interpretation, and you have no
authority to dictate that we are misusing the term.
At this point the debate between originalists and their
opponents stalemates. The strand concerning what interpreting a
text really is has run its course, and the nonoriginalists have
remained unmoved. They have demurred to the originalists’
claim that to interpret a text just is to ascertain its authoriallyintended meaning, and that other approaches amount to reauthorings rather than interpretations.
Originalists regarding legal texts may then switch to a
different strand of the debate. They may argue that the reason
we should seek the actual authors’ intended meaning is that the
actual authors possessed the legal authority to promulgate
norms, and their texts just are their communications of the
norms they intended to promulgate. If we ignore their intended
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meanings in favor of any of the infinite possible meanings
someone else might have intended through this set of symbols,
then we are ignoring the legal norms promulgated by those with
legal authority in favor of norms promulgated by persons who
lack that authority. If, for example, Congress has the legal
authority to make federal statutory law, then to ignore the
congressionally-intended meaning of a federal statute in favor of
a meaning that was not congressionally intended is to construct a
federal law that lacks constitutional authorization. So, too, if the
ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments are the persons
with authority to make and change constitutional norms, then to
“interpret” the Constitution as if it had been authored by
someone other than its ratifiers is to make constitutional “law”
without authority to do so.
What do nonoriginalists say in response to this argument, an
6
7
8
argument advanced by Rick Kay, Steve Smith, and me? They
typically do not deny that Congress is the body authorized to
make federal statutes, or that the ratifiers are persons with
authority to make and amend the Constitution. Rather, they
concede this, but then go on to argue that the authority to make
statutory or constitutional law is the authority to make the
texts—the set of symbols—but not the authority to determine
what those symbols mean.
Now, to repeat a point made earlier, it is true that the text—
the symbols—of statutes and the Constitution could have been
used to convey all sorts of meanings other than those
authorially-intended. And it may well be true that frequently the
symbols lawmaking authorities choose are better suited to
convey meanings different from what they intend. All of that is
true, but for originalists it is beside the point, which is that the
authors of those symbols were the ones possessed of authority to
make and change the law, making the meanings they intended
for their symbols to convey “the law.” Nonoriginalists, however,
must deny that such authority extends beyond the authority to

6. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the
Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
7. See Steven D. Smith, The Maker-Meaning Nexus (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
8. See Larry Alexander, What Are Constitutions, and What Should (and Can) They
Do?, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2011).
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promulgate the symbols. For them, the symbols are “the law,”
not what they were meant to symbolize.
To see the oddity of this nonoriginalist view, however,
engage in the following thought experiment. Lawmakers, we
assume, try to communicate their intended meanings as clearly
as they can. However, because of linguistic imprecision,
variations of usage, and the passage of time, they inevitably fall
short.
Suppose, however, our lawmakers could convey the norms
they intend for us to follow telepathically. They would not need
to promulgate any text. They would agree on those norms
among themselves—telepathically perhaps—and then convey
the agreed upon norms to the rest of us telepathically. Of course,
each of us might carry a “text” of such norms in our minds. But
the “text” in one person’s mind could differ from the “text” in
another’s mind. What is key is that however the norms were
represented in people’s minds, everyone would understand
precisely what those norms require in each conceivable
circumstance of application.
What objection could one have to law promulgation
through (perfect) telepathy? For the originalist, this scenario is
one of perfection. No more messy fallible texts to be
misunderstood. Such texts were imperfect media for transmitting
the lawmakers’ determinations to the populace. Telepathy is a
great improvement, for it results in no one misunderstanding
what the law requires.
How would nonoriginalists react to law promulgation
through telepathy? If they would welcome it, then it seems that
they have no quarrel with originalists. So if they have a quarrel,
they must object to telepathic law. But why?
One possible objection would be that lawmakers can never
anticipate all possible applications of their norms. Their
intended meaning will be uncertain, even to them, in some range
of applications. Therefore, even if telepathic communication
were possible, perfect understanding of what the communicated
norms required in all situations would not be possible.
That is a point originalists should concede. Lawmakers’
intended meanings will be equivocal, even to the lawmakers
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themselves, in some range of possible cases. And perfect
communication of those intended meanings will do nothing to
solve that problem. The other side of that coin, however, is that
in the remaining cases the authorially-intended meaning can
determine outcomes. So telepathic communication would be
useful for those cases. Therefore, unless one wishes to deny the
existence of general intended meanings—that when I say “green
things,” I intend to refer to a vast multitude of items that are
green in various hues and not just the particular green elm I have
10
in mind when I make the statement —the fact of some range of
indeterminacy or uncertainty does not defeat the utility of
telepathically communicating lawmakers’ intended meanings.
The other possible objection would be based on the
fallibility of the lawmakers. Even if we are sure how they
intended their norms to apply, we may know reasons that they
did not know—because of their historical or cultural setting,
their factual ignorance, or their prejudices—why their intended
applications are undesirable.
I shall consider below the possibility of giving interpreters
the legal authority to deviate from the intended meaning of the
lawmakers. Here, however, I wish to comment more generally
on arguments from fallibility.
It is, of course, true that lawmakers are fallible creatures of
their time and place, their understanding of the world, and so on.
Any norms they promulgate will therefore be fallible. And some
will quite possibly have very undesirable consequences when
faithfully applied. Yet to make such an argument against
following lawmakers’ intended norms is to make an argument
against law. For law is a human artifact. Even a legal system that
lacked legislation and that purported to follow the “natural law”
or the “moral law,” in order to count as a legal system, would
require authorities to determine what the natural law or moral
law required. Those authorities would be fallible, but their
determinations would be authoritative (else they would not be
authorities). And the meanings of their determinations would be
what they intended them to mean—meanings they might wish to
communicate, if they could, through telepathy rather than
through imperfect texts.
9. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 115–16
(2001).
10. See id. at 112–14.
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If nonoriginalists would have no cogent objection to
telepathic law, then their nonoriginalism perhaps stems from the
fact that lawmakers communicate their norms through texts
rather than through telepathy. Yet it is hard to see why the
search for authorially-intended meanings should be abandoned
just because of the possibility of error in ascertaining those
meanings. The authorially-intended meaning of a legal text can
be misunderstood, but so what?
Finally, nonoriginalists may object to giving absolute
lawmaking authority to the lawmakers who authored the text in
question. Originalism, however, is not an answer to who has
lawmaking authority. Its position is that whoever has lawmaking
authority, it is their intended meaning that governs. If their
intended meaning does not govern, then they necessarily lack
lawmaking authority. Originalists can happily concede that the
authority of one set of lawmakers—say, the Constitution’s
ratifiers—might be limited by the authority of another set—say,
the Supreme Court justices who placed a misinterpretation of
the ratifiers’ intended meaning in a now well-entrenched
precedent, or who determined that the ratifiers’ intended
meaning was “too unjust.” Originalists qua originalists have no
position on the allocation of legal authority in any particular
legal system. But notice that even in a system such as that
hypothesized, the intended meaning of one set of authorities
(the ratifiers) is trumped by the intended meaning of another set
of authorities (the Supreme Court). The different authoriallyintended meanings can be lexically ordered in terms of their
relative authority. But in no sense can they be intelligibly
combined—blended, averaged, or the like—into a meaning that
is no one’s intended meaning. (Such combinations are
incoherent; they are like “combining” pi, green, and the Civil
11
War. And even if it was possible, which it is not, it would render
12
the resulting law a “mindless” product.) Authorially-intended
meanings are still the basis of the law, and telepathic
communication thereof would still be desirable.
Finally, one might argue as follows: Authorities have the
ability to make law only if they truly are authorities. The ratifiers
of the Constitution were the makers of our fundamental law only

11. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL
REASONING 213–14 (2008).
12. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 109, 117 (1989).
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if they had authority to do so. And they had that authority only
if we, today, at this moment, accept that they did. If we no longer
accept their authority to make fundamental law, then they lack
that authority, even if our predecessors accepted their authority.
But why then, we might ask, should we accept their authority?
And should we not predicate our acceptance of their authority
on the normative desirability of the Constitution they made
rather than to attribute authority to them sight unseen?
Telepathic communication of their norms is of consequence only
if they have authority to govern us by those norms.
The points are correct. But notice that they do nothing to
undermine originalism, which is agnostic regarding who the
authorities—the lawmakers—are. For the originalist says that
whomever we accept as authorities to make law, constitutional
or otherwise, it is their intended meanings that count.
If we do not like the product of the 1789 constitutional
ratifiers, we might urge acceptance of our own, much better
document. If we succeed, then our document—a code conveying
our intended meanings—will be the supreme law of the land. Or,
to recur to the first strand of originalism, we might retain the
parchment version in the National Archives but urge others to
accept that it be read as if it had been written by John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, Larry Tribe, or Oprah. It will then mean what
those folks would have intended it to mean. Although it is
decidedly odd to have one person or group of persons author the
symbols of a legal communication, and then look to another
person or group and ask what they would have meant had they
authored those symbols, it is surely possible to do so.
Note, however, that if a constitution’s normative virtues
must be traded off against the virtues of wide acceptance and
stability, then we might find the optimum attainable constitution
is the one that assumes ultimate legal authority resides in the
1789 ratifiers. And if so, then their original meaning would be
our fundamental law, and telepathy from them would be a boon.
And the nonoriginalist’s response is. . .?
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APPENDIX: THE CONTRIBUTION THESIS
The claim is often made that the authorially-intended
meaning of an authoritative legal text, like a constitution or a
statute, contributes to its legal meaning but is not identical to it.
Let us put aside authoritative but erroneous interpretations
(mistaken precedents). Those create conflicts of authority that
are orthogonal to this issue. Likewise, let us put aside standards
of judicial review and burdens of proof, which bear on legal
meaning in adjudication but not on legal meaning per se. If those
matters are put aside, is not the authorially-intended meaning
identical to the legal meaning?
There are two related views that deny this. One, associated
13
with Philip Bobbitt, holds that arguments from authoriallyintended meaning—original meaning—are only one of several
modalities of legal argument. There are, on an equal footing with
arguments from the original meaning, arguments from text,
precedent, justice, and prudence.
The modalities argument is a nest of confusions. First, the
fact that lawyers argue for their favored outcome by invoking
whichever of these factors seems to favor their position does not
mean the law is nothing but the argumentative practice of
invoking these disparate considerations. Presumably, when
lawyers invoke text, justice, or original meaning, they claim that
the factor they invoke, not their practice of invoking it, is the law.
Second, the law cannot be all of these modalities
simultaneously. Indeed, the law can only be one of them, for the
modalities Bobbitt (and others) identify cannot coherently be
combined. Some of them could be lexically ordered, so that
precedent could trump original meaning, or vice versa. Or
extreme injustice might trump both. (Injustice per se could not,
as law exists to settle authoritatively what justice requires.) But
there is no sensible way one can nonlexically “combine”
precedent, original meaning, and justice, for example. That
14
would be like combining pi, green, and the Civil War.
If there were these several modalities, and if as I have
argued, they are uncombinable, then when two opposed
13. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); see also PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3–42 (1991).
14. I invoked this trope in the text at note 11 supra.
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lawyers invoke different modalities as constituting “the law,”
either they are arguing past each other, or else they are urging
the court to choose, perhaps for this case only, their favored
modality. I say “for this case only” because the various
modalities are supposed to persist despite not being
determinative in particular cases.
In truth, each modality represents a different legal system.
In constitutional law, each modality represents a different
Constitution. In the original meaning modality, the Constitution
is the set of norms intended by the framers and ratifiers of 1787,
1868, and so on. In the modality of precedent, the Constitution is
the set of norms that Supreme Court decisions have established,
presumably because the Court viewed those norms at the time
they were announced as consistent with the Constitution’s
original meaning. In the justice modality, the Constitution
consists of those norms that the “interpreter” believes justice
requires. It is the Constitution as if it had been written by—pick
your favorite—Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Robert Nozick,
John Stuart Mill, and so on. Because these modalities cannot be
coherently combined, and because it is incredible to believe that
advocates are invoking a modality—a Constitution—and asking
the court to choose it for this case only, the modalities
conception collapses.
My suspicion is that the appearance of several modalities is
produced for the following reasons. First, the original meaning
and erroneous judicial accounts of that original meaning that are
embodied in precedents create two conflicting sources of legal
authority. Second, considerations of justice cannot, as I have
said, be combined with original meaning or precedent. Nor can
justice compete with original meaning given that the purpose of
having authoritative legal texts and tribunals is to settle
authoritatively what justice requires. At most, considerations of
justice can be invoked when an authoritative standard needs to
be given content, or invoked as evidence of original meaning. All
of the other modalities mentioned by Bobbitt and others, can, I
believe, be shown to be derivative of original meaning or
precedent.
The other view that denies that the original meaning of legal
texts is identical to their legal meaning is somewhat more
elusive. Mitch Berman holds that even if the original meaning of
a legal text is X, and even if no one holds that “the law” arises
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from something other than that legal text, we might have strong
legal intuitions that the law is not X.
Berman gives as an example whether John McCain, who
was born in the then American territory of the Panama Canal
Zone, was a “natural born citizen” as the Constitution requires
15
for eligibility for the presidency. He argues that we might have
strong intuitions that McCain was eligible as a matter of
constitutional law, and that those intuitions might persist even if
we were to discover that the original meaning of the
constitutional clause made McCain ineligible.
In another paper, Berman fleshes this idea out a good deal
16
more. He asks us to imagine that the Equal Protection Clause’s
original meaning dealt only with the state’s provision of legal
protection, not with when the laws themselves were relevantly
unequal. He asks us then to imagine that soon after the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, people, including lawyers,
judges, and legislators, started assuming that the original
meaning of the Clause went well beyond protection and
extended to unjust discrimination in the content of the laws.
There was never an authoritative Supreme Court holding to this
effect. There were lots of dicta in Court opinions supporting this
broader notion of equal protection, however, and legislators
routinely invoked the broader notion to argue against the
passage of various laws.
Berman then asks us to imagine that after a long period in
which almost the entire legal community held this expansive
view of the Equal Protection Clause—again without any
Supreme Court decision directly on point—a judge were to
discover conclusive evidence of the original, narrow meaning of
the clause. According to Berman, it would be in bounds to argue
that the narrow meaning was not “the law,” and that the more
expansive meaning was.
Now I think Berman is just plain wrong here. Remember
that originally, people assumed (mistakenly) that the broad
meaning was the originally intended one. Their original error
merely ramified over time. To see why Berman’s view is
mistaken, compare his example with this one. Suppose the state
15. Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons
from John McCain and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, in ORIGINALISM IN
PERSPECTIVE (G. Huscroft & B. Miller eds., forthcoming).
16. Unpublished paper on file with author.
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legislature enacts a statute of limitation of three years for some
business tort. Suppose further that lawyers and judges thereafter
fail actually to look up the statute of limitations in the statute
books. They instead begin assuming that it is two years, perhaps
because two years is standard for other torts and because other
states make it two years for the particular tort in question. There
is never an actual holding by a court that this state’s statute of
limitation is two years, but one can find plenty of dicta to that
effect. And lawyers routinely refuse to bring tort suits because
they all believe the suits are barred by a two-year limitation.
Now suppose that one day a tort lawyer is thumbing
through the statute books and discovers that the statute of
limitations for the business tort is three years, not two. Or at
least that is what the statute says. This lawyer has a client who
suffered this tort more than two but less than three years ago. So
he brings suit. The defendant demurs, invoking the well known
“two year statute of limitations.” The judge is about to rule for
the defendant, when the plaintiff’s lawyer produces the statute.
Assume that defendants cannot claim any prejudice if the statute
of limitations turns out to be three years rather than two. Would
the judge be correct to say that despite the statute, the real
statute of limitations is two years? I believe that not even
Berman would support this. However, I can see no relevant
difference between this example and his.
My hunch is that the legal intuitions argument gets
whatever force it has in cases where the original meaning is
unclear and where we think considerations of policy or justice
strongly favor one possible meaning over the other. That
explains whatever force Berman’s examples have. On the other
hand, where the mistakenly assumed original meaning is viewed
as neutral or as undesirable, the “legal intuition” view has no
purchase. Most people, for example, probably wish that the
Fourteenth Amendment had not granted birthright U.S.
citizenship to the children of aliens temporarily or illegally in the
country. No other country does this, and there are no good
reasons to do it. Still, almost everyone assumes and has assumed
for a long time that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates this
result. If we now become convinced by scholars like Peter
17
that this interpretation is
Schuck and Rogers Smith
17. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
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erroneous—that “subject to the jurisdiction” was intended to
mean “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction”—would we still want
to say that the new interpretation was not the law? I think not.

18. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, cl. 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
. . . .”).

